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A country entering a monetary union gives up the right to determine its own
monetary policy. Individual ￿scal authorities promise passive ￿scal policy, allowing
the central monetary authority to use active monetary policy. Since a government,
which can print its own money, can honor its nominal debt unconditionally, entrance
into a monetary union raises new issues of potential ￿scal insolvency. When there
is an upper bound on the magnitude of the surplus and stochastic shocks to the
surplus, a government can ￿nd itself in a position in which it cannot borrow to
continue with its desired passive ￿scal policy. This paper considers the risk of a
￿scal ￿nancial crisis in a monetary union under alternative assumptions about how
the ￿scal authority would respond. The response a⁄ects the timing and probability
of a crisis. We consider both outright default and policy switching, whereby the
￿scal authority in crisis switches to active ￿scal policy and the monetary authority
switches to passive monetary policy. We apply the model to estimate ￿scal risk
in the European Monetary Union. Using panel estimates of the parameters in the
surplus rule and initial values for government debt and the primary surplus, we
simulate ￿scal risk under the two alternative ￿scal responses to a crisis. We ￿nd
that countries with initial values bound by the Maastricht Treaty limits are safe,
while countries like Italy and Greece, in which debt has strayed far above these
limits, might not be.
Key Words: European Monetary Union, Fiscal Theory of the Price Level, Policy
Switching, Default, Financial CrisisFiscal Risk in a Monetary Union
1 Introduction
On January 1, 2002 twelve European countries gave up their individual currencies and
adopted a common European currency, the Euro. This move has tremendous bene￿ts
in terms of the reduction in transactions costs that come with a larger market, but it
also entails risks. Government budgets experience stochastic shocks, due to wars, natural
disasters, business cycles, political decisions, etc. It is optimal for a government to smooth
the e⁄ects of these shocks, and governments typically do this using nominal debt. A
government which issues debt in terms of its own currency can honor its commitments
unconditionally because it can always print money to repay its debt. Printing money can
be costly in terms of in￿ ation, but this seigniorage can be used to balance the government￿ s
budget (Sargent and Wallace 1981). Alternatively, the government can allow real returns
on nominal government debt to be state-contingent even though nominal returns, as
measured by nominal interest rates, are not (Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe 1991). This is
achieved by surprise changes in the price level, which a⁄ect the real value of government
debt, and is the mechanism in the ￿Fiscal Theory of the Price Level￿(FTPL).(Sims 1994,
Woodford 1994). In either case, ￿scal solvency, as measured by intertemporal budget
balance, is achieved through changes in the purchasing power of private agents.
When a country joins a monetary union, it looses seigniorage and debt devaluation
through unexpected in￿ ation as instruments for achieving intertemporal budget balance.
The Maastricht rules were designed to assure that no country in the European Monetary
Union (EMU) would ever exert pressure on the European Central Bank (ECB) to restore
1these instruments. The rules focused on ￿scal soundness, requiring that each country￿ s
debt-GDP ratio remain well below the maximum any country could be expected to service,
and that government budget de￿cits remain small. Violations of the rules were to be
punished with ￿nes. Governments with commitments to the Maastricht rules are planning
to balance their intertemporal budget for any initial outstanding value of real debt. That
is, they are committing to follow a passive ￿scal policy as de￿ned in the FTPL. Therefore,
these rules and punishments can be viewed as a method of enforcing passive ￿scal policy
on member countries, leaving the ECB free to choose the price level with active monetary
policy. In the absence of additional constraints, a government which adheres to a passive
￿scal policy, will not face a ￿scal ￿nancial crisis.1
However, every government faces limits on its ability to raise taxes, which implies an
upper bound on the present value of the surplus and an upper bound on the value of
debt which the surplus can service. Governments have violated the Maastricht rules, and
future ￿scal shocks could send a government￿ s debt along a path expected to violate the
upper bound on debt. The upper bounds, together with stochastic shocks to the surplus,
imply ￿scal risk. Speci￿cally, stochastic shocks to the surplus could require very large
values for future surpluses, values so large that they could be infeasible. If stochastic
￿scal shocks place the system above the path leading to the maximum value for real debt,
then there is no interest rate at which agents would agree to lend. A sudden stop of
capital ￿ ows, which prevents the government from borrowing to continue its desired ￿scal
policy, de￿nes a ￿scal ￿nancial crisis.
1 Other papers which analyze implications of the FTPL for the European Monetary Union include Bergin
(2000), Sims (1997, 1999), Cochrane, (1998), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006).
2Crisis resolution requires policy action to restore equilibrium, and crisis dynamics are
partially determined by expectations of the policy response to a crisis. We consider two
types of policy response. The ￿rst is a policy response in which the crisis country reduces
the magnitude of debt through default to restore ￿scal solvency and continues passive
￿scal policy. In the second, the ￿scal authority in the crisis country switches to active
￿scal policy with the union monetary authority accommodating by switching to passive
monetary policy with a target for expected in￿ ation. We show that default without ￿scal
reform leaves markets turbulent such that they continue to expect and experience default
on the crisis country￿ s debt. Markets are orderly after policy-switching with expected
future in￿ ation equal to its target value.
If the monetary union is willing to allow a member country to default, then ￿scal
policy has no consequences for the monetary authority￿ s ability to control the price level.
Therefore, crisis analysis with a policy response of default is a positive analysis of the
consequences of allowing a member country to default. If default is unacceptable, as
suggested by constraints EMU member countries have chosen to impose on ￿scal policy,
then the analysis with a response of policy switching characterizes the threat of a ￿scal
￿nancial crisis to price stability.
Using panel estimates of the parameters in the surplus rule and initial values for
government debt and the primary surplus for the EMU countries, we simulate ￿scal risk
under alternative ￿scal responses to a crisis. We ￿nd that countries with initial values
bound by the Maastricht Treaty limits are safe, while countries like Italy and Greece, in
which debt has strayed far above these limits might not be.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the behavior of monetary
3and ￿scal policy in a monetary union, in which each country￿ s primary surplus is subject
to stochastic shocks, which the ￿scal authority wants to smooth over time using debt.
In the third section, we characterize an equilibrium, in which every country in the union
initially follows a ￿scal policy under which debt relative to output is expected to approach
a long-run equilibrium value. Government debt has risk due to the upper bound on
the primary surplus. The fourth section considers dynamics leading to a crisis under
alternative responses to the ￿scal crisis. The next section contains simulations of ￿scal
risk under alternative methods of response. The ￿nal section concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Overview
In this section, we set up a simple model of a monetary union which we can use to address
￿scal risk. The model contains three key assumptions. First, international creditors lend
to a government only when they expect to receive the market rate of return. Second, there
is an upper bound on the present value of primary surpluses relative to output which
a country can sustain. Third, ￿scal policy implies risk on government debt, re￿ ecting
concern by founders of the EMU, as well as the reality, that a government￿ s commitment
to raise taxes to ￿nance expenditures cannot be totally unconditional.
We ￿ll out the model with enough structure to obtain an equation for the evolution
of government debt relative to output. This requires speci￿cation of monetary and ￿scal
policy as well as government budget constraints. We assume that the monetary authority
has a price level target and that the ￿scal authority follows a rule relating the current
primary surplus to past debt. The rule is subject to stochastic shocks, giving ￿scal policy
4risk. The rule we choose is simple and does not require full speci￿cation of a general
equilibrium model. However, any rule with ￿scal risk could be used to complete the
model. The government￿ s intertemporal budget constraint, combined with the upper
bound on the present value of primary surpluses, imply an upper bound on the value of
debt.
2.2 Goods and Asset Markets
We assume that the monetary union consists of N countries. The j = 1;2;:::;N countries
are small enough that they cannot a⁄ect the world price level or world interest rate. There
is a single good in the world, implying that equilibrium in goods markets requires the law
of one price. Normalizing the world price level at unity and assuming no world in￿ ation
implies that the equilibrium price level in the monetary union is the exchange rate.
The ￿rst key assumption is that international creditors are willing to buy and sell
country j0s government bonds as long as its interest rate, ijt, satis￿es interest rate parity.
Interest rate parity can be derived as the Euler equation for a representative world agent
when the covariance of the country j interest rate with world-agent consumption is zero,
or when the world agent is risk neutral. Under the additional assumptions that the world














; j = 1;2;:::N (1)
where Et denotes the expectation conditional on time t information, Pt denotes the price
level in the monetary union, and ￿jt+1 is the fraction of the value of the j country￿ s bond
that will be repaid in period t + 1.
Interest rates in the monetary union countries can rise above the world interest rate
5when there is some possibility of a crisis which will be resolved with either default





. If default is used to resolve ￿scal crises, then a country
with a positive probability of default in the next period, such that Et￿jt+1 < 1; would
have an interest rate which is higher than the rate in other member countries for which
there is no probability of default. If default is ruled out as a policy response to a crisis,
then ￿jt+1 ￿ 1 8j; t; and all N member-country interest rates are equal. They can be
higher than the world rate when there is some probability that debt devaluation through
a price level surprise will be used to resolve a crisis.
2.3 Monetary Policy
We assume that with the creation of the monetary union, all N countries in the union
agree to follow a strongly passive ￿scal policy, which we de￿ne below, leaving the common
monetary authority free to determine the price level with an active monetary policy.
Monetary policy is assumed to have a ￿xed price level target, implying an in￿ ation target
of zero. When ￿scal policy for every country in the union is strongly passive and there
is no probability of default in the next period for any of the N countries, the price level
is ￿xed at its target and interest rate parity from equation (1) implies that the nominal
interest rates for all countries are equal at ijt = i:2
2 This policy could be implemented with a Taylor Ruler, whereby the monetary authority has a credible
threat to raise the nominal interest rate substantially in the event that price rises.
62.4 Fiscal Policy
2.4.1 Government Flow Budget Constraint
We assume that each government issues bonds denominated in the common currency. The

















The supply of the common currency in the union (Mt) is given by the sum of each country￿ s







Assuming that the monetary authority returns the interest on bonds to the gov-
ernments issuing those bonds, and letting ￿j be the ￿xed fraction of the union mone-
tary base provided by country j, then seigniorage revenues for country j are given by
ijtBM
jt = ijt￿jMt: Allowing for the possibility of default and simplifying notation by drop-
ping the subscript j, a government￿ s nominal ￿ ow budget constraint is given by
B
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+ Gt ￿ ￿tPtYt;
where Gt is nominal government expenditures, Pt is the price level, Yt is real output and ￿t
is the tax rate on nominal output. Letting small letters denote values relative to output,


























7Allowing for in￿ ation and default, either of which could be created by a ￿scal ￿nancial
crisis, the government￿ s ￿ ow budget constraint can be expressed in terms of debt and









bt￿1 ￿ st; (2)
where ￿t = Pt
Pt￿1 ￿ 1 is the in￿ ation rate, and g = Yt
Yt￿1 ￿ 1 is the output growth rate.4
Imposing interest rate parity from equation (1), and de￿ning ￿t as capital loss on the











the equation for the evolution of debt relative to output can be expressed as
bt = (1 + r)bt￿1 ￿ st ￿ (￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t): (3)





; and (￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t) is the
unexpected capital loss on government debt. Capital loss on debt can occur due to either
unexpected in￿ ation or default. Debt accumulates in response to expectations of capital
loss which are not realized. Expectations of capital loss raise the interest rate, and when
the capital loss does not occur, debt accumulates in response to the higher interest rate.
Optimization by the representative agent, together with the assumption that govern-
ments do not allow their debt to become negative in the limit,5 implies a government￿ s








that the ￿scal authority can adjust the surplus to o⁄set these.
4 We assume growth is non-stochastic to simplify the analysis. We could analyze the implications of
stochastic growth using a linearized model, but we reserve this for future work.
5 Sims (1997), Woodford (1997) and Daniel (2001) argue that no country, acting to maximize utility of
its own agents, would allow the present-value of its debt to become negative in the limit.

















Note that unexpected capital loss on debt, created either by default or by a price level
jump and represented by ￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t > 0; creates revenue.
2.4.2 Upper Bound
The second key assumption is that there is an upper bound on the present value of
the primary surplus relative to output that a government can sustain. We motivate this
with the realization that taxes are distortionary such that there will be an upper bound
on the fraction of income that a government can collect in taxes. Using the government￿ s
intertemporal budget constraint, equation (4), this implies an upper bound on the current





where ￿ ’ is the value of the upper bound on the primary surplus relative to output.
The upper bound on debt relative to output rules out an equilibrium in which debt
relative to output is explosive. This di⁄ers from original presentations of the FTPL, in
which debt relative to output can increase forever in equilibrium, as long as its growth
rate is less than the growth-adjusted rate of interest.7
6 Woodford (1994) derives of the constraint as an equilibrium condition for a closed economy.
7 Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001) base their empirical test determining whether monetary policy in
the US is active or passive on the intertemporal budget constraint, as in early presentations of the FTPL.
Sims (1997) argues that governments instead should be concerned with stabilizing debt relative to GDP,
as in the current paper. Cochrane (1998) explains the di⁄erence in the two perspectives.
92.4.3 Fiscal Policy Rule
We assume that the ￿scal authority is able to commit to a surplus rule8, in which the
primary surplus responds to its own lag and a linear combination of the target value of
the long-run primary surplus and debt service at the growth-adjusted interest rate. The
surplus rule for a particular country is given by
st = (1 ￿ ￿)st￿1 + ￿[(1 ￿ ￿)’ + ￿rbt￿1] + ￿t; (6)
0 < ￿ < 1; 0 ￿ ￿; 0 < ’ ￿ ￿ ’;
where ’ is the value of the target for the long-run primary surplus relative to output,
(1 ￿ a) measures persistence in the primary surplus, ￿ represents the responsiveness of
the surplus to the value for debt service relative to its long-run target value, and ￿t is a
bounded, zero-mean, stochastic disturbance representing ￿scal shocks. Stochastic shocks
represent both truly unanticipated ￿scal shocks, as with a war or natural disaster, as well
as ￿scal policy responses to the state of the economy. The lagged value of the primary
surplus relative to output re￿ ects the desire to smooth the e⁄ect of shocks over time and
is consistent with empirical evidence showing persistence in the primary surplus. Since
the model is speci￿ed in terms of debt and the primary surplus relative to output, we
refer to these variables simply as debt and the surplus when there is no confusion.
Equations (3) and (6) imply dynamic equations for the surplus and debt;
st = (1 ￿ ￿)st￿1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)’ + ￿￿rbt￿1 + ￿t (7)
bt = (1 + r ￿ ￿￿r)bt￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)st￿1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)’ ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t + Et￿1￿t (8)
8 The rule gives the government credibility, limiting the e⁄ect of negative ￿scal shocks on the expected
present value of future surpluses.
10The third key assumption is that ￿scal policy entails risk. In our speci￿cation, risk
is due to the upper bound and stochastic shocks. Governments understand this risk,
and the parameters they choose re￿ ect their risk tolerance, determined in part, by the
cost of a crisis. For the simulation exercises later in the paper, we let the data reveal the
parameter values the authorities chose in solving their optimization problem. Empirically,
countries do choose rules with risk, and the Maastricht limits on debt and de￿cits re￿ ect
policy-maker concerns that at least some EMU countries might choose risky rules.
2.4.4 Stability and Dynamics
The time paths for each country￿ s surplus and debt can be determined by solving equations
(7) and (8). Letting ￿ represent eigenvalues, which are assumed to be real and distinct,
the characteristic equation for each country is given by
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + r) ￿ ￿[1 + r(1 ￿ ￿￿) + 1 ￿ ￿] + ￿
2 = 0: (9)
No Upper Bounds To understand the behavior of the model without crises, consider
the dynamic stability of the model for di⁄erent values of ￿ when there is no upper bound
on the value of the surplus. Equilibrium in the absence of upper bounds is de￿ned as
De￿nition 1 Given constant values for the world interest rate and world price level, a
monetary-policy price-level target, and a surplus rule (equation 7) for each country, an
equilibrium is a set of time series processes for each country￿ s primary surplus, debt, and
capital loss on debt, fbt;st;￿tg
1
t=0, such that each government￿ s ￿ow and intertemporal
budget constraints (equations 8 and 4) hold, expectations are rational, and world agents
expect to receive the return on assets determined by interest rate parity, (equation 1).
For ￿ ￿ 1 both eigenvalues are on or inside the unit circle, and the model is globally
stable. Debt and the surplus are each expected to reach a long-run equilibrium values for
any initial values of the variables, including ￿t. Therefore, the expected present value of
11debt relative to output goes to zero in the limit, implying that equation (4) is satis￿ed for
any stochastic process for ￿t. A ￿scal policy for which the present value of debt relative
to output is zero in the limit for any initial value of the price level is de￿ned as passive
￿scal policy. When ￿scal policy is passive, the monetary authority is free to follow an
active policy and choose ￿t = 0 in equilibrium, consistent with its ￿xed price-level target.
Alternatively when 0 ￿ ￿ < 1; one eigenvalue of the characteristic equation is inside
the unit circle and the other is outside, implying that the model is saddlepath stable.
The system reaches a long-run equilibrium only if it begins on the saddlepath. Otherwise,
debt can be on a path where it is expected to grow faster than output. For 0 < ￿ < 1;
debt relative to output is always expected to grow more slowly than the growth-adjusted
interest rate. This implies that the expected present value of debt relative to output in
the limit is zero, or equivalently, that equation (4) is satis￿ed for any stochastic process
for ￿t: Fiscal policy is passive, and in the absence of any upper bounds, ￿ > 0 is su¢ cient
for the monetary authority to freely choose ￿t = 0; maintaining its ￿xed-price target.
For ￿ = 0; the expected present value of debt relative to output is no longer zero
in the limit unless the system is on the saddlepath. Therefore, there is no equilibrium
unless there is a jumping variable, o⁄setting shocks, to keep the system on the saddlepath.
The only candidate is the real value of debt through ￿t: Therefore, ￿t must be free to
experience positive and negative jumps to keep the system on the saddlepath, as in the
FTPL. This represents an active ￿scal policy because the government￿ s intertemporal
budget is balanced only for the value of real debt along the saddlepath, not for all values.
When some ￿scal policies in the union are active, then the active ￿scal policies together
determine ￿t. Therefore, a ￿scal rule with ￿ = 0 implies that the monetary authority
12does not have the freedom to determine the price level.
Upper Bounds The upper bound on debt has di⁄erent implications for the constraints
on monetary policy when ￿ takes on values between zero and unity. For 0 < ￿ < 1;
debt relative to output is always expected to grow more slowly than the growth-adjusted
interest rate, but debt can grow faster than output. Paths along which debt grows faster
than output violate the upper bound and cannot be equilibrium paths. Since such paths
are inconsistent with equilibrium, there must be a jumping variable to move the system
away from these paths onto the saddlepath. In equilibrium, the value of ￿t jumps to keep
the system on the saddlepath, implying that the monetary authority loses its ability to
control the price level.
E⁄ectively, with an upper bound given by (5), monetary freedom to control the price
level in equilibrium requires that each ￿scal authority follow a rule with ￿ ￿ 1: We refer
to such policy as "strongly passive" because it rules out explosive debt relative to output.
The standard de￿nition of passive ￿scal policy without an upper bound restricts debt
relative to output to grow more slowly than the growth-adjusted interest rate in the limit,
requiring only ￿ > 0: However, this de￿nition does not rule out growth of debt relative
to output, which would eventually violate any upper bound.
In summary, consideration of upper bounds implies that a necessary condition for the
monetary authority to be able to choose the price level, that is to choose ￿t; is that the
surplus rule restrict ￿ ￿ 1: This restriction assures that the long-run values for debt and
the surplus are not expected to violate their upper bounds. However, upper bounds can
imply crises even under a surplus rule with ￿ ￿ 1: This can occur when the adjustment
13path toward long-run equilibrium values requires a value for debt which exceeds its upper
bound. We turn to this below.
3 Dynamics under Strongly Passive Fiscal Policy
Consider the dynamic behavior of debt and the surplus in a newly-formed monetary union
in which each country is committed to strongly passive ￿scal policy. Equations (7) and
(8) with ￿ ￿ 1 can be solved to express the time paths for the surplus and debt relative
to output in each country yielding
st = ’ +
(￿2 ￿ 1 + ￿)￿
t
1
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿1 ￿ ￿2)
n
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2 [￿2￿k + (￿2 ￿ 1 + ￿)(￿k ￿ Ek￿1￿k)]
)
(11)
where ￿1 ￿ 1 and ￿2 < 1 are the eigenvalues of the characteristic equation (9). The time
paths depend on initial values, ￿scal shocks, capital losses and their expectations. When
the country is far from a crisis, ￿t = Et￿1￿t = 0: The values for ￿t and its expectations in
the neighborhood of a crisis are endogenized below.
143.1 No Upper Bound
When there is no upper bound on debt and ￿ ￿ 1, equation (11) can be used to show that
the government￿ s intertemporal budget constraint is satis￿ed for any stochastic process
for ￿t: With institutions strong enough to prevent default the ￿scal authority can borrow
freely and the monetary authority is free to set ￿t = Et￿1￿t = 0; achieving its price level
target. In equilibrium, with no possibility of either default or in￿ ation, agents are always
willing to lend at the world interest rate (equation 1).
To facilitate understanding, it is useful to represent the dynamics of the debt-surplus
system using country phase diagrams. We can construct the phase diagram for each
country by subtracting lagged values of the surplus from equation (7) and lagged values
of debt from equation (8) to yield:
￿st = st ￿ st￿1 = ￿￿st￿1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)’ + ￿￿rbt￿1 + ￿t; (12)
￿bt = bt ￿ bt￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿￿)rbt￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)st￿1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)’ ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t + Et￿1￿t: (13)
The phase diagram under passive ￿scal policy with ￿ > 1 and with ￿t = ￿t￿Et￿1￿t = 0
is given in Figure 1. Debt service (rb) is on the vertical axis and the surplus is on the
horizontal axis. The ￿s = 0 and ￿b = 0 schedules intersect at point P with st = ’ = rbt;
representing a long-run equilibrium. The system is globally stable around its long-run
equilibrium target values. If initial debt and the surplus are at point A, then the system
is expected to travel along AP, eventually reaching the long-run equilibrium point P.
Equations (12) and (13) can be used to show that with ￿t = ￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t = 0; the










Over time, ￿scal shocks (￿t) could move the system away from its initial passive adjust-
ment path, labelled AP, possibly to an adjustment path like HP. Along HP, the debt and
the surplus are expected to overshoot their long-run equilibrium values. However, in the
absence of upper bounds, the government￿ s intertemporal budget constraint is satis￿ed
along any adjustment path. Since the monetary authority￿ s choice of price a⁄ects the ini-
tial position and any initial position is consistent with equilibrium, global stability allows
the monetary authority to adhere to its ￿xed price level target, setting ￿t = Et￿1￿t = 0:
3.2 Upper Bounds
Consider the implications of an upper bound for the viability of passive ￿scal policy, using
Figure 1. Assume that the initial adjustment path is AP. A ￿scal shock moves the system
in either a northwest or southeast direction from the initial path. Consider a sequence
of shocks which eventually moves the system above the adjustment path AP, to point
H. In the absence of an upper bound, the adjustment path HP is an equilibrium path.
However, when debt has an upper bound given by equation (5), adjustment along the
HP path requires values for debt greater than its upper bound. This path violates the
government￿ s intertemporal budget constraint because it requires that debt be expected
to pass through a point where it exceeds the maximum present value of future surpluses.
Since the ￿scal authority could never service or repay such a large debt, agents could not
expect to receive the market rate of return on debt along the path HP, implying that HP
cannot be an equilibrium path.
16As a country nears a crisis, which could require ￿t > 0; agents begin to anticipate the
capital loss. The expectation a⁄ects the evolution of debt and surpluses. Once shocks
together with expectations send the system onto a path like HP, agents refuse to lend.
This sudden stop of capital ￿ ows requires a ￿scal response since the government cannot
continue its policy of smoothing ￿scal shocks using government debt. The timing of the
sudden stop itself and the actual dynamics depend on how the ￿scal authority is expected
to react to the crisis. We consider two possible policy responses to the crisis, default to
reduce the magnitude of the debt, and policy reform with ￿scal policy switching to active
and monetary policy switching to passive.9
4 Fiscal Financial Crises
Consider the equilibrium dynamics leading to a ￿scal ￿nancial crisis under alternative
assumptions about the government￿ s response to the ￿nancial crisis. We assume that
agents know the ￿scal response to the crisis. Crises are most likely to occur in the region
in which both debt and the surplus are rising. Below, we restrict attention to this region.
Equilibrium in the presence of upper bounds is de￿ned below.
De￿nition 2 Given constant values for the world interest rate and world price level,
a monetary price-level target, a surplus rule (equation 7) and an upper bound on debt
(equation 5) for each of the j countries, and a policy-response in the event of a ￿scal crisis,
an equilibrium is a set of time series processes for each country￿ s primary surplus, debt,
and capital loss on debt, fbt;st;￿tg
1
t=0, such that each government￿ s ￿ow and intertemporal
budget constraints (equations 8 and 4) hold, expectations are rational, the debt for each
country does not exceed its upper bound, and world agents expect to receive the return on
assets determined by interest rate parity (equation 1).
9 Cooper, Kempf, and Peled (2008) show how alternative policy responses can represent multiple equi-
libria based on agents￿beliefs about the policy response.
174.1 Default
Consider the case in which the country responds to a sudden stop of capital by reducing
the magnitude of debt through default. With this crisis response, the ￿scal authority
remains committed to the strongly passive ￿scal policy rule, given by equation (12).
When the monetary union is willing to allow a member country to default, the possibility
of a ￿scal ￿nancial crisis poses no threat to the monetary authority￿ s ability to control
the price level. As agents anticipate default in country h, Et￿ht+1 < 1; and the monetary
authority upholds its price level target by keeping ijt = i for all j 6= h; allowing iht to rise
to satisfy equation (1) for the crisis country. Although a default policy response poses
no threat to price stability, its economic consequences could be judged so detrimental
that the union could choose to rule out default. Therefore, crisis analysis with a policy
response of default should be viewed as a positive analysis of the characteristics of such a
crisis.
To determine the probability of a crisis next period and expectations of one-period-
ahead capital loss on government debt, it is useful to compare the current value of debt,
whose evolution is given by equation (8), with the value of debt along the adjustment




, denoted as ￿ bt. We cannot obtain a closed-form
expression for￿ bt as a function of st: However, we can take a piecewise linear approximation
of this path about st￿1 and ￿ bt￿1, using equation (14) to yield




(st ￿ st￿1); (15)
where
￿t￿1 =
r￿ bt￿1 ￿ st￿1
￿
￿
￿r￿ bt￿1 ￿ st￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)’
￿; (16)
18and st ￿ st￿1 is given by equation (12).
The vertical distance between debt along the path to the upper bound and the current
value of debt is given by
xt￿1 = ￿ bt￿1 ￿ bt￿1:
Equations (8), (12), (15), and (16) can be used to show that the distance evolves as
￿ bt ￿ bt = xt = ￿t￿1xt￿1 + ￿t￿1￿t + ￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t; (17)
where
￿t￿1 = 1 +
￿r(1 ￿ ￿)(’ ￿ st￿1)
￿
￿
￿r￿ bt￿1 ￿ st￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)’
￿:
Assume that, when faced with a crisis in which it cannot borrow the desired
amount, the government reduces the magnitude of debt through a default to




r: Note that we are allowing
the government to choose a default magnitude larger than necessary to restore solvency,
but we are assuming that agents know this choice. This requires that the government
reduce the magnitude of current debt to the value of debt along the path that is expected
to reach a maximum at
^ ’
r, given by^ bt ￿ ￿ bt. Therefore, if unable to borrow, the government
is expected to use default to set the distance between ^ bt and bt equal to zero. This assures
that debt is not expected to travel above the government￿ s desired maximum value given
by
^ ’
r. Letting  t￿1 =
￿
^ bt￿1 ￿￿ bt￿1
￿
￿ 0 and rede￿ning the ￿t￿1 and ￿t￿1 to be a function
of ^ bt￿1 instead of ￿ bt￿1;10 the distance between ^ bt and bt is given by
￿t = ^ bt ￿ bt = xt +  t = ￿t￿1
￿
xt￿1 +  t￿1
￿
+ ￿t￿1￿t + ￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t: (18)
10We are approximating the adjustment path which reaches a maximum value of debt given by
^ ’
r about
values along that path, given by ^ bt￿1:
19Note that the magnitude of default necessary to set ￿t = 0 is determined by the desired









state variable determining a crisis becomes xt￿1 +  t￿1 = ^ bt￿1 ￿ bt￿1.
De￿nition 3 Conditional on the expectation that a lending crisis will be resolved with




r, a boundary locus
for debt service (rb) is de￿ned as the piecewise continuous path, given by the expected path
for debt service passing through the maximum value for rb of ^ ’ for s ￿ s￿ and by rb = ^ ’
for s ￿ s￿; where s￿ =
^ ’(1￿￿￿)￿￿(1￿￿)’
1￿￿ is the value of s along the expected adjustment path
at the point with rb = ^ ’:
Figure 1 shows the boundary locus for debt as BLM. Note that the boundary locus
is de￿ned with respect to the government￿ s desired maximum value of debt, not by its
upper bound. For ￿t = ￿t = Et￿1￿t = 0; a positive value for xt￿1 + t￿1 implies that bt￿1
and bt are below the boundary locus. However, ￿scal shocks (￿t), expectations of default
(Et￿1￿t), and default (￿t) can all a⁄ect the position of bt relative to the boundary locus.
We de￿ne a shadow value of default, analogous to the shadow value of the exchange
rate in generation one currency crisis models (Flood and Garber 1984). Conditional on a
crisis in which agents refuse to lend, the shadow value of default represents the reduction
in the value of debt needed for the economy to reach the boundary locus. The shadow
value can be positive or negative.
De￿nition 4 The shadow value of capital loss on debt due to default at time t; ~ ￿t; is
de￿ned as the value of ￿t for which ￿t = 0:
Setting ￿t to zero in equation (18) implies
~ ￿t = Et￿1￿t ￿ ￿t￿1
￿
xt￿1 +  t￿1
￿
￿ ￿t￿1￿t: (19)
Equations (18) and (19) imply that the distance between ^ bt and bt can be expressed as
￿t = ￿t ￿ ~ ￿t: (20)
20Assume that agents believe that the ￿scal borrowing constraint will bind,
creating default, i⁄ ~ ￿t > 0. We prove that this assumption is consistent with a rational
expectations equilibrium below in Proposition 2. Under this assumption, the actual value
of the capital loss due to default is given by
￿t = maxf~ ￿t;0g: (21)
To determine the probability of a crisis and expectations of default, de￿ne ￿￿
t as a
critical value for ￿t such that ￿t > 0 for ￿t < ￿￿
t; and ￿t = 0 for ￿t ￿ ￿￿
t: Letting f (￿t)
be a bounded, symmetric, mean-zero distribution for ￿t; with bounds given by ￿ ￿ ￿, the


















t) as the cumulative at ￿￿
t and collecting terms on the expectation yields













Substituting into equation (21) yields an implicit expression for ￿t as





















t) has the interpretation as the probability of default. De￿ne ￿t =
R ￿￿
t
￿￿ ￿ ￿tf (￿t)d￿t+
[1 ￿ F (￿￿
t)]￿￿
t: A solution for ￿￿
t exists i⁄there exists a value for ￿￿
t, satisfying ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
t ￿
￿ ￿; which sets ￿t￿1
￿
xt￿1 +  t￿1
￿
+ ￿t￿1￿
t = 0 such that ￿t = 0 in equation (23).
Lemma 1 There is no equilibrium solution for ￿￿
t when xt￿1 +  t￿1 < 0; that is, when
debt is above the boundary locus at time t ￿ 1.
21Proof. Given that ￿t￿1 > 0 and ￿t￿1 > 0; the proof must show that ￿
t ￿ 0: To prove that
￿
t ￿ 0; let ￿￿
t take on its smallest possible value of ￿￿ ￿: Then ￿
t = ￿￿ ￿ < 0: The derivative
of ￿
t with respect to ￿￿
t is given by 1 ￿ F (￿￿
t): For ￿￿
t < ￿ ￿, the derivative is positive.
Therefore, as ￿￿
t rises, ￿
t rises monotonically. Once ￿￿
t takes on its largest possible value,
given by ￿ ￿, 1 ￿ F (￿ ￿) = 0, and ￿
t takes on its maximum value of zero. Therefore, ￿
t ￿ 0
for all feasible values of ￿￿
t: This implies that when xt￿1 +  t￿1 < 0; there is no feasible
value for ￿￿
t which sets ￿t￿1
￿
xt￿1 +  t￿1
￿
+￿t￿1￿
t = 0 such that ￿t = 0 in equation (23).
Lemma 2 When xt￿1 +  t￿1 > 0; the probability of a crisis in period t is less than one,
and when xt￿1 +  t￿1 = 0, the probability of a crisis in period t is one.
Proof. When xt￿1+ t￿1 > 0; Lemma 1 implies that ￿
t < 0; requiring ￿￿
t < ￿ ￿: Therefore,
the probability of a crisis, given by F (￿￿
t); is less than one. When xt￿1 +  t￿1 = 0; ￿￿
t
must set ￿
t = 0, implying that ￿￿
t = ￿ ￿: Therefore, the probability of a crisis, given by
F (￿ ￿); is one.
Intuitively, when the debt is below the boundary locus at time t ￿ 1, the probability
that a monetary union country following a strongly passive ￿scal policy will encounter a
￿scal crisis in the next period is less than one. Even though expectations of default raise
the interest rate and raise debt, sending it toward the boundary locus, it is possible to
receive a large positive ￿scal shock and still be safe. However, once the debt reaches the
boundary locus, a ￿scal crisis and default occur almost surely with any ￿scal shock. The
only time that default does not occur is when the government receives the largest positive
￿scal shock, and the probability of receiving the largest positive shock is zero.
Lemma 3 A solution for Et￿1￿t exists if and only if xt￿1 +  t￿1 ￿ 0:
22Proof. When xt￿1+ t￿1 > 0; Lemma 2 implies that the probability for default is positive.
Expectations of default are given by the solution to equation (22).
When xt￿1 +  t￿1 = 0; Lemma 2 implies ￿￿
t = ￿ ￿: With the critical value equal to its
upper bound, any value of the ￿scal shock ￿t requires ￿t ￿ 0: Together xt￿1+ t￿1 = 0 and
equation (19) imply that ￿t = ~ ￿t = Et￿1￿t￿￿t￿1￿t ￿ 0 for any realization of ￿t, including
its upper bound, ￿ ￿: Therefore, expectations of capital loss on debt due to default must
satisfy
Et￿1￿t ￿ ￿t￿1￿ ￿:
When bt￿1 is along the boundary locus, expectations of default are subject to a lower
bound and can be arbitrarily large.
When xt￿1 +  t￿1 < 0; the shadow value of default is positive for any value for ￿t;
implying an unitary probability of default. Taking expectations of equation (21), using
equation (19) when the probability of default is unity yields
Et￿1￿t = Et￿1￿t ￿ ￿t￿1
￿
xt￿1 +  t￿1
￿
:
This equation has a solution for the expectation only if xt￿1+ t￿1 = 0: When xt￿1+ t￿1 <
0; there can be no value for default such that it equals its expectation minus a negative
gap.
Intuitively, if the debt will be above its boundary locus at time t with probability one,
then there will be a crisis at time t￿1. Creditors stop lending at time t￿1 because there
is no interest rate which can compensate them for expectations of default at time t. Only
when xt￿1 +  t￿1 ￿ 0; can creditors be compensated for expectations of default, keeping
borrowing constraints from binding.
23Proposition 1 For positions of bt￿1 on or below the boundary locus
￿
xt￿1 +  t￿1 ￿ 0
￿
,
the equilibrium interest rate in period t ￿ 1 increases to adjust for rational expectations
of default (Et￿1￿t > 0); allowing the government to borrow at its desired level in period
t ￿ 1. However, for positions of bt￿1 above the boundary locus
￿
xt￿1 +  t￿1 < 0
￿
, there
is no interest rate which can compensate agents for expectations of default, implying that
such positions cannot represent an equilibrium.
Proof. For positions for debt on or below the boundary locus, Lemma 2 shows that the
probability of a crisis is one or less than one, respectively. Equations (22) and (1) can be
used to solve for the values of expected default and the interest rate. Lemma (3) shows
that for positions above the boundary locus, there is no solution for the expected value
of default. Therefore, there is no value of the interest rate which can compensate agents
for lending, implying that these positions cannot satisfy the de￿nition of equilibrium.
It is now necessary to prove that whenever ~ ￿t > 0, agents refuse to lend, thereby
eliciting a ￿nancial crisis with ￿t = ~ ￿t > 0: Assume that bt￿1 is in a position below the
boundary locus BLM, such that xt￿1 +  t￿1 > 0: Additionally, assume that the position
is near enough to the boundary locus that Et￿1￿t > 0: From this initial position, the
economy receives a ￿scal shock, given by ￿t:
Proposition 2 There is no equilibrium without default in period t if ~ ￿t > 0. Default,
given by ￿t = ~ ￿t restores equilibrium.
Proof. Equilibrium in period t requires xt +  t ￿ 0. This is because Lemma 3 shows
that there can be no equilibrium rational expectations value for Et￿t+1 when xt + t < 0:
Therefore, if xt +  t < 0; then there is no equilibrium unless the country defaults. Using
equation (17), yields
xt +  t = ￿t￿1
￿
xt￿1 +  t￿1
￿
+ ￿t￿1￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t + ￿t = ￿t ￿ ~ ￿t:
24Therefore, when xt +  t < 0; ~ ￿t > 0: A positive shadow rate triggers default. Default,
with ￿t = ~ ￿t; sets xt +  t = 0; restoring equilibrium by Lemma 1.
Therefore, Proposition 2 validates agents￿assumption that the government will default
whenever ~ ￿t > 0: Intuitively, in the event of a sudden stop, the country promises default
in magnitude su¢ cient to restore ￿scal solvency. The sudden stop occurs when ~ ￿t > 0;
and the government responds as promised.
Corollary 1 A government which wants to sustain current ￿scal policy as long as possible
chooses ^ ’ = ￿ ’, implying that  t = 0 for all t:
Proof. The position of the boundary locus is determined by ^ ’, and the boundary locus
is higher the larger is ^ ’. This is because, by Propositions 1 and 2, the state variable
determining a crisis becomes xt￿1 +  t￿1 = ^ bt￿1 ￿ bt￿1, and is independent of the upper
bound.
We can use the phase diagram in Figure 1 to illustrate crisis dynamics. When the
system is far from its boundary locus BLM, such that no ￿scal shock could send it over,
expectations of default are zero, and the system is governed by the arrows of motion send-
ing it to its long-run equilibrium target values. Once the system reaches the neighborhood
of the boundary locus, agents begin to expect default, and the associated risk premium on
debt causes debt to increase more quickly than shown along illustrated adjustment paths.
Once a shock, combined with equilibrium expectations of default, sends the system above
the boundary locus, default is necessary to bring the system back to the boundary locus.
Proposition 3 In the absence of ￿scal reform, equilibrium after default requires addi-
tional default each period until debt falls below the boundary locus on its approach to the
long-run equilibrium value.
Proof. A default in period t; which brings the system to the boundary locus, implies
25that xt +  t = 0: By Lemma 2, the probability of a crisis in period t + 1 is unity and by
Lemma 3, Et￿t+1 ￿ ￿t￿ ￿. Given a realization for ￿t+1; default occurs in the magnitude to
set xt+1+ t+1 = 0: The pattern persists until the dynamics imply that debt travels along
a path like the solid path LP, which is below the boundary locus BLM.
Post-crisis equilibrium is characterized by repeated default which can be arbitrarily
large in magnitude. Expectations of default must be large enough that default occurs
for any ￿scal shock. This is because of the one-sided nature of default, whereby default
always reduces the value of debt. Expectations of default must be correct on average,
implying that expectations of default must be the average value of default. Therefore,
following the crisis, markets remain turbulent for some time. Agents expect additional
default, interest rates are high, and additional default is necessary. This pattern does
eventually end once the dynamics move the economy toward the long-run equilibrium
below the boundary locus.
4.2 Monetary and Fiscal Policy Switching
The second possibility we consider is that a government facing a sudden stop reneges on
its commitment to strongly passive ￿scal policy. With this ￿scal response, existence of an
equilibrium requires the cooperation of the monetary authority. The monetary authority
could prefer to cooperate over allowing default with its post-crisis turbulence.11 Under
policy switching, expectations of post-crisis capital loss on debt are zero, in contrast to
high expectations of additional capital loss after default. We consider a switch in ￿scal
policy from strongly passive to active, accompanied by a monetary policy switch from
11An alternative, but analytically equivalent possibility, is that the crisis country could withdraw from
the monetary union, reissue its own currency, and follow passive monetary policy.
26active to passive. With this response, the monetary authority looses control of the price
level, re￿ ecting concern by the EMU founders regarding ￿scal restraint.
When a crisis is anticipated, the monetary authority increases the interest rate, to
accommodate Et
Pt
Pt+1 < 1; while keeping the current price level ￿xed. After the switch
to passive monetary policy, the monetary authority replaces its price level target with
an in￿ ation target with Et
Pt
Pt+1 = 1: Therefore, after the switch, the monetary authority
retains control of expected in￿ ation, but not of actual in￿ ation.
Before analyzing the switching model, it is useful to understand equilibrium in a
monetary union with one active ￿scal policy country, N ￿1 strongly passive ￿scal policy
countries, and a passive monetary authority.
4.2.1 Active Fiscal Policy in the N￿ th Country and Strongly Passive in the
Others
Consider a monetary union in which ￿scal policy is active in the N0th country and strongly
passive in all others. Active ￿scal policy is modeled as ￿ = 0: The active-￿scal-policy
system we solve analytically is comprised of equations (7) and (8) with ￿ = 0, in which
the eigenvalues of the characteristic equation (9) are 1 + r and 1 ￿ ￿. We assume that
with ￿scal reform, the government can choose a di⁄erent value for ’ subject to ’ ￿ ￿ ’:
Under active ￿scal policy, the intertemporal budget constraint holds only for a unique
initial real value of debt and hence for a unique initial price level. With default ruled out,
monetary policy must be passive allowing the value for ￿t to set the coe¢ cient on the
explosive root to zero. This is the policy combination analyzed in the FTPL.
The time paths for the surplus and debt in the active-￿scal-policy country with ’ = ￿ ’
27are given by12
st = ￿ ’ + (1 ￿ ￿)
t
"























These equations can be used to express the saddlepath relationship between debt and the







￿ ’￿(1 + r)
r(￿ + r)
: (26)
When there are stochastic shocks to the surplus, the real value of debt must jump to keep
the system on the saddlepath, as in the FTPL. Since all other ￿scal policies are passive,
there is only one unstable root in the system of N countries.
The equations for changes in the surplus and debt with ￿ = 0 and ’ = ￿ ’ can be
computed from equations (7) and (8) to yield
￿st = st ￿ st￿1 = ￿￿st￿1 + ￿￿ ’ + ￿t; (27)
￿bt = bt ￿ bt￿1 = rbt￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)st￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ’ ￿ ￿t + Et￿1￿t ￿ ￿t: (28)
The phase diagram under active ￿scal policy and with ￿t = ￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t = 0 is given in
Figure 2. The saddlepath has a slight positive slope. The saddlepath with ’ = ￿ ’, which
is the saddlepath determining the largest possible value of debt under active ￿scal policy,
is labeled as SP1.
Since the system does not reach an equilibrium for arbitrary starting values, this is an
active ￿scal rule. Fiscal shocks, ￿t; move the system away from the saddlepath. To assure







k=1 (1 + r)
￿k
h




28that debt does not violate its upper bound, there must be one jumping variable to assure
that the system is on the saddlepath. Price level jumps create jumps in ￿t: From equation
(8), bt jumps with each jump in ￿t; allowing the system to remain on the saddlepath. For
an equilibrium to exist, monetary policy must be passive, as assumed, allowing ￿t to jump.
Capital gains and losses on government debt are symmetric, implying that expectations of
gains and losses are zero in the active-￿scal-policy, passive-monetary-policy regime. The
upper bound poses no constraints other than the the fact that it sets an upper bound
on the value for the ’.13 If the government chooses ’ = ^ ’ < ￿ ’; then in Figure 2, shifts
￿s = 0 left and ￿b = 0 right (not shown) shifting the saddlepath down to SP2.
4.2.2 Active Fiscal Policy in Two Countries
Consider a monetary union with active ￿scal policy in 2 countries and strongly passive
￿scal policy in N ￿ 2: Although there are N values for ￿t, there is only a single indepen-
dent one. The value for ￿t is determined such that the present-value of total monetary
union debt equals the present-value of total monetary union surpluses. Debt in each
strongly-passive-￿scal-policy country must equal the expected present-value of surpluses.
Therefore, the value for ￿t must equate the sum of the expected present-value of surpluses
for the two active-￿scal-policy countries with the sum of their initial debt.
When there are two countries with active ￿scal policy, the equilibrium jump in ￿t,
which places the sum of the two countries￿debt on a saddlepath, would land one country￿ s
debt above its saddlepath and the other country￿ s debt below its saddlepath. Therefore,
one country would expect rising debt and the other falling debt. The country with falling
13There are no constraints in the region in which debt and the surplus are both rising. The upper bound
on debt does imply that positions on the saddlepath beyond bt =
￿ ’
r are not feasible.
29debt would be transferring resources to the other over time. This suggests that an equi-
librium in which two ￿scal policies are active is unlikely to persist. The country with
falling debt would optimally choose to switch back to strongly passive ￿scal policy and
reduce its taxes in accordance with its lower debt to avoid a resource transfer away from
its citizens, leaving a single country with active ￿scal policy.
4.2.3 Fiscal Crisis Resolved with Fiscal Policy Switching
Consider crisis dynamics under the assumption that the monetary union has agreed to
respond to a ￿scal ￿nancial crisis in one country by allowing the crisis country to switch
to active ￿scal policy with accommodation by the monetary authority. We assume that
all countries initially follow a strongly passive ￿scal rule and maintain this policy for as
long as possible. Figure 3 superimposes the saddlepaths for an active policy system on
the passive policy system for a particular country.
After the policy switch, the system must be on the saddlepath in order to reach an
equilibrium. Therefore, the largest possible value for debt after policy reform is given
by the saddlepath leading to ￿ ’, labeled SP1. Rede￿ne the state variable at time t; as
the distance between the largest possible post-crisis value of debt, given by SP1, and the
current value of debt under passive ￿scal policy. Using equations (26) and (8), the state










+ (1 ￿ ￿)’: (29)
Note that, as in the default case, the state variable determining the time t distance receives
a t ￿ 1 subscript since its value is known at time t ￿ 1: Using equations (7) and (8), the










￿ (￿ ’ ￿ ’) ￿ ￿(’ ￿ rbt): (30)
Assume that, when faced with a crisis in which it cannot borrow the desired amount,
the ￿scal authority institutes ￿scal reform. It switches to an active ￿scal policy with





r; as in the default case. In Figure 3, the saddlepath to ^ ’ is labeled
SP2. Under policy-switching, the system must begin on SP2, implying that the distance
between the saddlepath value of debt and the current value of debt must be zero. Using









+ ￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t: (31)
where   =
￿ ^ ’￿￿ ’
r
￿
: Note that the distance between the post-reform value of debt along




and not by debt￿ s possibly larger upper bound since xt￿1 +   does not contain the
term
￿ ’
r. Additionally, the evolution of xt +   depends on its own lag and on ^ ’; not ￿ ’:
De￿nition 5 Conditional on the expectation that a lending crisis will be resolved with
policy switching, accompanied by a new target surplus of ^ ’ ￿ ￿ ’; a boundary locus for debt
service (rb) is de￿ned as the piecewise continuous path, given by the saddlepath leading to
^ ’ for s ￿ ^ ’ and by rb = ^ ’ for s ￿ ^ ’:
Figure 3 shows the boundary locus for debt as CKM. Note that the boundary locus is
de￿ned with respect to the government￿ s desired maximum debt, not by its upper bound.
For ￿t = ￿t = Et￿1￿t = 0; a positive value for xt￿1 +   implies that bt￿1 and bt are below
the boundary locus. However, ￿scal shocks (￿t), expectations of in￿ ation (Et￿1￿t), and
in￿ ation (￿t) can all a⁄ect the position of bt relative to the boundary locus.
31We de￿ne a shadow value of capital loss on government debt due to in￿ ation. The
shadow value of capital loss represents the reduction in the value of debt needed for the
economy to reach the boundary locus. The shadow value can be positive or negative.
De￿nition 6 The shadow value of capital loss on debt due to in￿ation at time t, ~ ￿t, is
de￿ned as the value of ￿t which sets ￿t = 0:
Setting ￿t = 0 and solving yields









We assume that in the event of a crisis the ￿scal authority never raises the value of debt
to reach the saddlepath. In the event of a lending crisis with debt below the boundary
locus, the ￿scal authority reduces the long-run target value of the surplus such that the
current value of debt without in￿ ation is on the saddlepath to lower long-run values for
the surplus and debt. However, if a ￿scal shock sends the system above the boundary
locus, then in￿ ation is necessary because post-reform equilibrium requires ￿t = 0. Using
equations (31) and (32), the distance between the saddlepath value of debt and the current
value of debt can be expressed as ￿t = ￿t ￿ ~ ￿t:
Assume that agents believe that the ￿scal borrowing constraint will bind, creating
policy switching with ￿t = ~ ￿t if ~ ￿t > 0: We prove that this assumption is consistent with
a rational expectations equilibrium below.14 This implies that the value for in￿ ation in
the crisis period is given by equation (21), where we rede￿ne ~ ￿t using equation (32). If
we rede￿ne ￿t￿1 = ￿ =
￿(1+r)
￿+r and ￿t￿1 = ￿ =
(1+r)
￿+r ; then Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, and
Proposition 1 apply directly to the switching case.
14In contrast to the default case, under switching, a crisis could occur with ~ ￿t < 0; as we show below.
Therefore, the statement is expressed as an if statement, not as an i⁄ statement.
32Consider how a crisis arises, when it will be resolved with policy-switching. Assume
that bt￿1 is in a position below the boundary locus SP2, such that xt￿1 +   > 0: Addi-
tionally, assume that the position is near enough to the boundary locus that Et￿1￿t > 0:
From this initial position, the economy receives a ￿scal shock, given by ￿t:
Proposition 4 Given initial policy and expectations about policy-switching, a crisis oc-
curs in period t if xt +   < 0. Policy switching restores equilibrium.
Proof. Lemma 3 shows that there is no equilibrium rational expectations value for
Et￿t+1 when xt +   < 0: There is no interest rate at which agents would lend under the
original strongly passive ￿scal policy, triggering a crisis and policy switching. Therefore,
if xt +   < 0, then there is no equilibrium in the absence of policy switching
Policy switching restores equilibrium by setting ￿t = 0: There are two ways in which
this can happen, depending on the value for ~ ￿t: When ~ ￿t > 0 (￿t < 0); a price level jump
setting ￿t = ~ ￿t; assures ￿t = 0; placing the system on the saddlepath.
However, it is possible for xt+  < 0, when ~ ￿t ￿ 0 (￿t ￿ 0): This is because equations
(30) and (32) can be used to show that the state variable evolves as
xt +   =
r + ￿
￿
(￿t ￿ ~ ￿t) ￿ (^ ’ ￿ ’) ￿ ￿(’ ￿ rbt):
In this event, we assume that there is no de￿ ation. Instead, policy switching entails
choosing a target surplus lower than ^ ’; in order to place the system on a lower saddlepath
without a price level change. The lower target surplus reduces the distance between debt
along the new lower saddlepath and its current value to zero, reducing ￿t to 0.
A crisis occurs when the government can no longer borrow to continue with the strongly
passive ￿scal rule. Assume that debt at time t￿1; is at point H along path HP in Figure
333. Along the path HP, the distance between the debt along the boundary locus and the
current value of debt becomes negative. Since this is inconsistent with equilibrium, HP
cannot be an equilibrium path. However, the expectation of a regime switch in the future
makes point H feasible because the expectation raises the expected present-value surplus
to equal the value of outstanding debt.
In the neighborhood of the boundary locus, the market begins to anticipate in￿ ation.
This anticipation forces the interest rate to increase to incorporate the increase in expected
in￿ ation. The monetary authority accommodates to allow an equilibrium with regime
switching. Once agents anticipate in￿ ation, the system approaches the boundary locus
SP2 at a faster rate than implied by the adjustment path HP, as shown in Figure 3 by
the arrow from point H.
A crisis occurs when agents refuse to lend, and there are two ways in which this can
happen. As the passive-￿scal system approaches the saddlepath, a negative ￿scal shock
could send it over such that xt +   < 0 and ~ ￿t > 0. The government￿ s response is to
promise ￿scal reform. This implies a regime switch with a price level jump to bring the
system to the saddlepath. After the policy switch, the system travels along the saddlepath
SP2.15
Alternatively, the dynamics of the surplus and debt under passive policy could imply
that debt next period, in the absence of regime switch, would travel above the saddlepath
such that xt +   < 0; but ~ ￿t < 0.16 Agents would not lend into this position since no
rationally-expected value for future in￿ ation could place the system on the saddlepath.
15Since the probability of devaluation is less than one, when a shock occurs requiring devaluation, its
magnitude is greater than expected allowing b to jump downwards.
16This could occur since the passive ￿scal policy adjustment path can be steeper than the saddlepath SP.
34Regime-switch with no change in the price level allows debt and the surplus to move along
a saddlepath below SP2, implying a long-run surplus below ^ ’:
Proposition 5 Equilibrium after policy switching is characterized by the FTPL. The
price level jumps following ￿scal shocks to keep the system on the saddlepath. On average
the jumps are zero, implying that expected in￿ation and Et￿1￿t are both zero.
Proof. Expected in￿ ation is determined by the monetary authority￿ s price level target,
implying an in￿ ation target of zero. Since the mean of ￿scal shocks is zero, the mean of
price level shocks is zero.
Equilibrium after policy switching entails both positive and negative shocks to the price
level, o⁄setting ￿scal shocks, but expected in￿ ation remains at the monetary authority￿ s
target of zero.
4.3 Summary of Crisis Characteristics
It is useful to summarize the characteristics of a ￿scal ￿nancial crisis. First, a crisis
generally occurs when debt is below its upper bound. There are two reasons for this.
One is the upward sloping boundary locus, which implies that the upper bound on debt is
lower for values of the surplus below the long-run equilibrium value. Second, a government
might not be willing to let debt travel as high as its absolute maximum, e⁄ectively lowering
the boundary locus and the value of debt which elicits a crisis.
Crises are imperfectly predictable. Once a crisis becomes possible, the interest rate
rises, re￿ ecting the expected capital loss on debt. The increase in the interest rate causes
debt to accumulate more quickly, increasing the probability of a crisis. The more rapid
growth in debt, due to the higher interest rate, implies that a crisis can occur even when
the economy receives a favorable shock. This is possible when the favorable shock is small
35relative to the expected capital loss. However, if a country receives large enough favorable
shocks, then it can escape the crisis.
Crises develop suddenly. For a country whose debt is substantially below the boundary
locus, the probability of ever having a crisis is very low. However, once its debt is close
enough to the boundary locus to elicit expectations of one-period-ahead capital loss, then
rising interest rates increase the rate of growth of debt. This implies that to avoid a
crisis, the country must on average receive favorable ￿scal shocks. Therefore, as soon as
interest rates begin to rise, the probability of a crisis sometime in the future jumps from
something very low to something greater than ￿fty percent.
Crises are preceded by rising interest rates, but the sudden stop of capital ￿ ows is
indeed sudden. A country can be conducting its desired ￿scal policy and borrowing at
risk-adjusted interest rates until the combination of expected capital loss and a ￿scal shock
sends the country above the boundary locus. This creates a sudden stop of capital ￿ ows
because there is no interest rate which could compensate lenders for expected capital loss.
Agents lend again only after the ￿scal response has restored ￿scal solvency.
Finally, it is also useful to compare the two policy responses to a crisis, debt reduction
through default and policy switching, possibly with debt reduction through in￿ ation. The
relative probability of a crisis under alternative policy responses depends on the relative
slopes of the boundary loci. We address this issue in simulations later and ￿nd that
crisis probability is very similar under the two responses. The e⁄ects of the alternative
policy responses are most di⁄erent in their post-crisis equilibria. Since default is one-
sided (no revaluations of debt), the post-crisis equilibrium after default is characterized by
high expectations of additional default and by additional default until debt has traveled
36along its adjustment path below the boundary locus BLM. In contrast, the post-crisis
equilibrium after policy-switching is characterized by both positive and negative price
level shocks, which o⁄set ￿scal shocks, but whose expected value is zero.
4.4 Other Possible Policy Responses
Reduction of the magnitude of debt through default and policy switching are not the only
possible policy responses to a crisis. Other possible responses are brie￿ y considered here,
but full analysis of them is left to future research.
Once a crisis becomes anticipated with some positive probability, the government could
implement ￿scal reform with the objective of reducing the probability of a crisis. However,
given that the probability of a crisis becomes positive following negative ￿scal shocks, the
promise of larger near-term surpluses, in the presence of economic circumstances that
reduce surpluses, is unlikely to be credible. And, even after ￿scal reform, ￿scal policy still
has risk unless the government can eliminate the source of stochastic shocks.
Another possible response would be a promise of ￿scal transfers from member countries
to the crisis country. Countries might not be willing to make this promise given the obvious
moral hazard problem. And, even if countries do promise to use ￿scal transfers, then ￿scal
risk applies to aggregate member debt instead of to individual country debt. Once the
aggregated ￿scal authority faces a crisis, there must be some alternative response since
there can be no ￿scal transfers in the aggregate.
Alternatively, the union￿ s monetary authority could resort to an increase in traditional
seigniorage to provide additional revenue to the crisis country, e⁄ectively increasing the
upper bound on debt. However, acceptable magnitudes are likely to be small. And
37implementing this policy without ￿scal transfers requires increasing seigniorage for all
member countries, not just for the crisis country. Additionally, the increase in seigniorage
is likely to require an increase in both crisis and average post-crisis in￿ ation, as in Sargent
and Wallace (1981). This sustained increase in in￿ ation after the crisis is likely to be
more objectionable than stochastic in￿ ation around its target, as implied by a response
of policy-switching.
Finally, a country could withdraw from the monetary union and reissue its own cur-
rency, as suggested by Sims (1999). If the country also institutes policy reform, switching
￿scal policy to active and its own new monetary policy to passive, then the analysis would
be much as in the switching model presented here. Alternatively, the new monetary au-
thority could be pressured to provide additional seigniorage, as in Sargent and Wallace
(1981), yielding larger seigniorage revenues and a larger value for the upper bound on
debt.
5 Simulations of Crisis Risk
In this section, we use simulations to consider the ￿scal risk faced by di⁄erent countries in
a monetary union under the two possible ￿scal responses to a crisis, default (D) and policy
switching (SW). Given parameter values for the N ￿scal rules, the distribution of ￿t; and
the method of crisis resolution, the system can be solved numerically and simulated to
generate the risk of one country in the N-country monetary union encountering a crisis
over a given period of time.17
17The methodology is similar to that in Garcia and Rigobon (2004) who use simulation to determine the
probability that Brazilian debt will reach a ￿xed upper bound within a particular time frame. In our
model, the upper bound is not ￿xed, but is given by the boundary locus.
38Using annual data over the 1970-2006 period, Daniel and Shiamptanis (2008) provide
group mean estimates of parameters for the surplus rule using cointegration and error-
correction models for a panel of ten EMU countries. The baseline parameters we use for
the simulations are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Baseline Parameters
i ’ ￿ ￿ g
parameters 0.0422 0.0388 0.4987 1.3003 0.0262
standard errors 0.0061 0.0076 0.0717 0.0901 0.0027
We use these estimates together with the group mean panel estimate of the long-run
value of output growth g, to specify values for the real interest rate, i; the target value of
the long-run primary surplus, ’; the growth-adjusted real interest rate, r, the persistence,
1 ￿ ￿, and the responsiveness of the surplus to the value for debt service relative to
its long-run target value, ￿:18 Under the assumption that ￿scal shocks have a normal
distribution with mean zero, the panel estimate of their standard error is 1:42% of GDP.
We let the upper bound on the ￿scal shocks, ￿ ￿; be 2:84% of GDP, which corresponds to
two standard deviations. We set the desired maximum value of the surplus, ^ ’; at 4% of
GDP which is larger than ninety percent of the actual primary surplus ratios achieved in
our sample.19
We consider risk faced by an individual country. We use 1,000 replications of a ten-year
simulation, under the two ￿scal responses to a crisis, to estimate the probability of a ￿scal
18The variables in the paper of Daniel and Shiamptanis (2008) are in levels, whereas the variables in this
paper are expressed as percentages of output. This implies that the ￿ in this paper is ￿ = ^ ￿
1+g, where
^ ￿ = 0:5118; and the growth-adjusted real interest rate is r =
i￿g
1+g:
19Out of the 370 primary surplus/GDP observations, there are only 35 observations in which their values
are larger than 4% of GDP.
39crisis and the average time to a crisis. In each simulation, initial values of debt/GDP,
bt￿1; and the primary surplus/GDP, st￿1; are used to set the initial value for the distance,
xt￿1+ t￿1: For the default case, we use a numerical approximation of the boundary locus
to obtain a value for ^ bt￿1. The dynamic system then receives a ￿scal shock, ￿t; from the
truncated normal distribution. Based on xt￿1 +  t￿1 and ￿t, the critical value for the
shock, ￿￿
t; the expectation for capital loss, Et￿1￿t; and the value for capital loss, ￿t; are
calculated. If ￿t = 0; then next period￿ s surplus and debt are updated using equations
(7) and (8), which are then used to update xt + t. The process is repeated for ten years.
If during the ten-year simulation we have a value of ￿t > 0 or xt +  t < 0 then there
is a crisis and the simulation ends. We repeat the ten-year simulation 1000 times. The
probability of a crisis over ten-years is the number of crises divided by 1000, the number
of replications.
To determine the safety of a country which adheres to the Maastricht rules, we simu-
lated the model with values for initial debt and the primary surplus under the Maastricht
rules. We set the actual surplus (not primary) at -3% of GDP and debt at 60% of GDP.
Under the baseline parameter values, ￿scal policy is very safe with no crises over ten
years in the 1,000 replications. We considered several sensitivity analysis scenarios to
raise the risk. These include changing parameter values one at a time by two standard
deviations in the risky direction and simultaneously increasing the nominal interest rate
and reducing the growth rate, both by two standard deviations.20 Under each of the sim-
ulations to increase risk, a country under Maastricht rules is perfectly safe over the ten
20Experiments included raising i to 0:0544, raising ￿ to 1:4805, reducing ￿ to 0:3553, reducing g to 0:0208;
reducing ’ and ^ ’ to 0:0236, and increasing the upper bound on ￿ ￿ to 4:26% of GDP (which corresponds
to a three standard deviation increase). Note that an increase in i to 0:0544 and a decrease in g to 0:0208,
increase r to 0:0329.
40year horizon. We also ￿nd that countries like France, Germany, and Belgium, with small
deviations from the Maastricht rules are perfectly safe under the risk-increasing scenarios.
This implies that the limits in the Maastricht Treaty might be too strict.
Next we consider whether high-debt countries like Italy and Greece, which have vio-
lated the Maastricht rules, face any risk over the next ten years. For Italy, the 2007 value
of debt/GDP was 116.14%, and the primary surplus/GDP was 1.95%. For Greece, the
2007 value of debt/GDP was 103.82% and the primary surplus/GDP was 1.01%.21 Under
the baseline parameter values and sensitivity analyses, whereby we move parameters one
at a time in the risky direction by two standard deviations, both Italy and Greece are
perfectly safe over the next ten years. However, as we increase the real growth-adjusted
interest rate from this point, possibly due to a simultaneous increase in the nominal in-
terest rate and a decrease in the growth rate, crisis probability becomes positive and rises
at an increasing rate, as shown in Figure 4. Since debt/GDP is higher for Italy than for
Greece, the crisis probability becomes positive at a lower value for the growth-adjusted
real interest rate for Italy. We also considered how crisis probability changes as debt
increases with parameter values set at their baseline values. Since the estimated value for
’ is large, debt can become quite large under the baseline parameters before the ten-year
probability of a crisis becomes positive. Once the probability becomes positive, crisis
probability increases at an increasing rate in debt, as shown in Figure 5. The expected
number of years to a crisis falls as its probability rises.
Crisis probability rises at an increasing rate, either as parameter values change in the
risky direction or as debt increases, because expectations of debt devaluation rise as the
21Source: OECD
41economy approaches the boundary locus. Higher expected debt devaluation increases the
interest rate and increases the rate at which debt accumulates. As a country approaches
the boundary locus, a slight change in parameters or in debt can create a dramatic change
in crisis probability. This illustrates forcefully that a country receiving favorable shocks
can substantially reduce and/or eliminate the probability of crisis without ￿scal reform.
It also illustrates the reverse. A country can substantially increase its crisis probability
with small changes in debt which push it critically toward the boundary locus.
These simulations of ￿scal risk are conditional on ￿scal policy following the rule esti-
mated for the panel over the period 1970-2006. They ignore any policy di⁄erences among
countries. We are also ignoring the likely correlation of ￿scal shocks across countries
combined with the fact that a ￿scal crisis in one country can a⁄ect the interest premium
in another under policy-switching. This implies that risk is actually higher, and future
research is needed to address this.
6 Conclusions
Countries in the EMU no longer feel compelled to follow the rules set out in the Maastricht
Treaty. Some economists argue that there is no need for any coordinated ￿scal restraint.
Yet, others are concerned that unrestrained ￿scal policy could pose problems for the
monetary authority￿ s ability to control in￿ ation
We present a model to analyze how a country following a strongly passive ￿scal policy,
subject to stochastic shocks and an upper bound on the present value of surpluses, could
experience a ￿scal ￿nancial crisis in which agents refuse to lend. When faced with a
sudden stop in capital ￿ ows, such that a government is unable to continue with its desired
42￿scal policy, some ￿scal response is needed. We consider two responses; maintenance
of the strongly passive ￿scal policy combined with default to reduce the magnitude of
outstanding debt, and policy switching. If the monetary authority is willing to allow a
member country to experience default and the associated post-crisis market turbulence,
then a ￿scal ￿nancial crisis in one country need not impair the monetary authority￿ s
ability to control in￿ ation. However, if the monetary authority prefers policy switching
to allowing member default, then a ￿scal ￿nancial crisis in one country can impair the
monetary authority￿ s ability to control in￿ ation.
The paper makes two primary contributions. The ￿rst is theoretical. We use insights
from the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level to determine when an agent would refuse to
lend to the government in equilibrium. This allows us to model the dynamics of a ￿scal
￿nancial crisis, demonstrating how an upper bound on the value of debt relative to output,
combined with stochastic shocks to ￿scal policy, could give government debt risk, even
when policy is governed by a strongly passive ￿scal rule.
Second, it provides simulations using estimated parameter values and initial conditions
from EMU countries to determine the probability of a ￿scal ￿nancial crisis in the next
ten years, under alternative assumptions about the ￿scal response to a crisis. We ￿nd
that a country operating at the upper bound of the Maastricht Treaty is perfectly safe
over a horizon of ten years. Additionally, countries like Belgium, France and Germany
with small violations, are also perfectly safe. However, countries like Italy and Greece
with high debt, are safe under the baseline parameter values, but there are reasonable










j ˆ L M
j
* s
Figure 1: Passive Fiscal Policy
Note: s￿ =
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1￿￿ is the value of s along the adjustment path BP at the point L
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